Ninety deals in 90 days? What to expect as tariff negotiations wind down

^{By Stephen Olson}

^{June 24, 2025}

With the 90-day negotiating window to avert or reduce President Trump’s so-called “liberation day” tariffs set to close on July 9th, what can we expect to see, especially in terms of impact for U.S. agriculture?

Given his unpredictability and proclivity for rapid course reversals, offering specific prognostications on Trump’s trade policy decision-making is ill-advised under the best of circumstances. At the same time however, a couple of clear directional signals have emerged which provide at least a few hints on where we might end up. Three points in particular should be borne in mind:

Many countries will be left on the outside looking in. Reality has begun to set in, and earlier comments from administration officials about “doing 90 deals in 90 days” are now recognized as being wildly unrealistic. While an agreement with the UK has already been concluded, and additional agreements will undoubtedly be announced in the weeks to come, many if not most of the countries facing reciprocal tariffs will find themselves without an agreement. In those cases, Trump has indicated that Commerce Secretary Lutnick will simply “inform” countries of the tariff level they’ll be facing.

At that point, countries will have two options: either begrudgingly accept the tariffs and simply get on with life or retaliate in-kind against the U.S. Countries have grown skillful in crafting retaliation packages to maximize both economic and political pain. 

Given the economic importance of U.S. agricultural exports and the political importance of several key agricultural states, it is extremely likely that U.S. agriculture interests will be targeted for retaliation by those countries choosing to take that path. This could take the form not only of higher tariffs, but could also include a variety of other restrictions, such as manipulation of sanitary and phytosanitary standards, quotas, preferences for other sources of agricultural supply, or all of the above.

Second—and somewhat more encouragingly for U.S. agriculture—those counties that are able to secure “deals” with the U.S. will almost certainly have to agree to commitments to purchase more U.S. goods. This is especially true for countries that run large trade surpluses with the U.S. In the critical Indo-Pacific region, China, Vietnam, Malaysia, and India are likely to face U.S. demands for purchase commitments. 

In a potential preview of what we can expect to see, Vietnam has recently agreed to purchase $3 billion in agricultural products, after a tour of important U.S. agricultural states led by the Minister of Agriculture and Environment. In the previous Phase One agreement China reached with the U.S. in 2020 during the first Trump administration, China agreed to substantial purchase commitments of $200 billion, prominently including $32 billion in U.S. agricultural products. China managed to hit only 58% of its commitments overall and 77% for agriculture – an outcome China attributed to Covid disruptions.

In any case, though, U.S. agricultural interests should anticipate that at least some of the agreements reached will include purchase commitments. What is less clear, however, is whether these commitments will ultimately be fulfilled.

Finally, expect the U.S.-China strategic rivalry to cast a wide shadow over negotiations between the U.S. and third countries. As we saw in the agreement with the UK, the U.S. intends to use these negotiations to pressure countries to tilt away from China. The UK agreed to various “security” commitments that are intended to squeeze China out of critical supply chains, especially steel. 

Not surprisingly, China is responding forcefully and is applying its own pressure on countries not to agree to any such conditions. Countries in Southeast Asia are increasingly finding themselves “caught in the middle.” It is unclear to what extent this dynamic could complicate U.S. efforts to reach agreements in the region. However, one typical refrain heard in Southeast Asia on this topic goes something like this: “Don’t ask us to choose. You might not like the answer.”

Barring a last-minute extension—always a possibility—we are heading towards the conclusion of negotiations on the liberation day tariffs. U.S. agricultural interests will undoubtedly be affected, but until we see the substance of agreements concluded, as well as the reaction of countries unable to secure deals, the net impact remains an entirely open question. Given how high the stakes could potentially be, though, the progress of the negotiations and the ultimate outcomes should be closely monitored.

Opinions expressed are solely those of the author and not the Yeutter Institute or the University of Nebraska-Lincoln.

Stephen Olson is a Non-resident fellow and visiting lecturer for the Yeutter Institute and a senior adjunct fellow at the Pacific Forum.

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